The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the
quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width
of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels.
However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables
levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on
systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are
configured in the IOMMU.
On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary
amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch
page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels
only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively
becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine
mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE.
Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets
read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment,
possibly leading to data leaks.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-445.html | Patch Vendor Advisory |
History
No history.
MITRE Information
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: XEN
Published: 2024-01-05T16:34:49.531Z
Updated: 2024-01-05T16:34:49.531Z
Reserved: 2023-10-27T07:55:35.331Z
Link: CVE-2023-46835
JSON object: View
NVD Information
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2024-01-05T17:15:11.147
Modified: 2024-01-11T15:56:04.093
Link: CVE-2023-46835
JSON object: View
Redhat Information
No data.
CWE