An issue was discovered in uIP 1.0, as used in Contiki 3.0 and other products. The code that parses incoming DNS packets does not validate that the incoming DNS replies match outgoing DNS queries in newdata() in resolv.c. Also, arbitrary DNS replies are parsed if there was any outgoing DNS query with a transaction ID that matches the transaction ID of an incoming reply. Provided that the default DNS cache is quite small (only four records) and that the transaction ID has a very limited set of values that is quite easy to guess, this can lead to DNS cache poisoning.
References
Link Resource
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01 Third Party Advisory US Government Resource
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128 Third Party Advisory US Government Resource
History

No history.

cve-icon MITRE Information

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: mitre

Published: 2020-12-11T22:26:47

Updated: 2020-12-11T22:26:47

Reserved: 2020-08-07T00:00:00


Link: CVE-2020-17439

JSON object: View

cve-icon NVD Information

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2020-12-11T23:15:12.857

Modified: 2020-12-15T15:36:04.430


Link: CVE-2020-17439

JSON object: View

cve-icon Redhat Information

No data.

CWE