The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2018/06/13/10 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152703/Johnny-You-Are-Fired.html | Third Party Advisory VDB Entry |
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Apr/38 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/30/4 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired | |
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/blob/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf | |
https://www.enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/changelog | Exploit Vendor Advisory |
History
No history.
MITRE Information
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published: 2018-06-13T23:00:00
Updated: 2019-05-16T17:11:33
Reserved: 2018-06-07T00:00:00
Link: CVE-2018-12019
JSON object: View
NVD Information
Status : Modified
Published: 2018-06-13T23:29:00.393
Modified: 2019-05-16T18:29:00.297
Link: CVE-2018-12019
JSON object: View
Redhat Information
No data.
CWE